Mission Analysis Report, 19 February 45

LT SNEDEKER

E-BL-3

HEADQUARTERS
486TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

MISSION ANALYSIS REPORT

Planning

DATE: 19 February 45

GP MSSN NBR: 147

TARGET: (P) M/Y Rheine, Germany

ALERTED AT: 1840

BOMB LOAD REC'D AT: 2300

WG AWO REC'D AT: 2150

WG F/O REC'D AT: 0230

DIV F/O REC'D AT: 0135

ZERO HOUR: 1230

FORCE REQUIRED: One (1) group of three (3) squadrons

FORCE FURNISHED BY SQUADRON (PLANNED AND ACTUAL):

	832nd	833rd	834th	835th	Total
Crews	13 (13)	12 (12)	11 (12)	2 (2)	38 (39)
A/C	12 (14)	7 (6)	11 (11)	8 (8)	38 (39)

AIR LEADER: Major Howell (Wing Lead)

PARTICIPATING STAFF:
(1) Capt Dimel (Ld-Hi Sq)
(2) Lt Heckerson (Ld-Lo Sq)
(3) Capt Simpson (Dep Ld-Lo Sq)

LEAD CREWS:
(1) Howard (Gp-Ld)
(2) Hunter (Dep Ld-lo Sq)
(3) Beard (Dep Gp Ld, Ld-Hi Sq)
(4) Ringler (Dep Ld-Hi Sq)
(5) Hinze (Ld-Lo Sq)
(6) Dibble (Dep Ld-Lo Sq)

BRIEFING OFFICER: Capt Whitney

BRIEFING TIME: 0900

BOMB BRIEFING: Capt Scott

NAV BRIEFING: Capt Boyle

S-2 BRIEFING: Lt Carlin

BOMBING ALTITUDE: 23,000'

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM: 4th "A" Group (4th in #2 task force)

ESTIMATED TIME OF TAKE-OFF: 1155

RETURN: 1700

ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: GP: 18,000' WG: 18,000' DIV: 19,500'

REMARKS: None.

II.

EXECUTION:

TAKE-OFF: 1157-1235 RUNWAY: 25 WIND: 180° @ 9 MPH
A/C TAKING OFF.: SQ "A" 12 SQ "B" 13 SQ "C" 14 TOTAL: 39
ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: GP: 18,000', WG: 18,000' DIV: 19,500'

ELAPSED TIME OF ASSEMBLY:
One (1) hour and fifty-one (51) minutes from time of take-off. Lead a/c reached assembly altitude (18,000') at 1255, and group was formed at 1348.

ASSEMBLY (GP, WG & DIV):

Group assembly was good, being made at 18,000'. A slight shortage of time was experienced in making timings good, probably occasioned by the delay in take-off when runway was changed. BUN 22 was departed about one-half (1/2) minutes late, and BUN 23, second point on assembly line, reached one (1) minute late. Position in task force was taken in Division column at CP #1 without difficulty.

ARRIVED 1ST PT WG ASS'Y LINE: 1350 1/2- one half (1/2) min late.

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM: 4th "A" Group (as briefed)
DEPARTED CP "1": 1403 - on time.
CLIMB TO ALTITUDE (ROUTE IN):
Climb to bombing altitude was started at 1358 hours over BUN 23. The English coast was departed on time about two (2) miles to the north at an altitude of 19,500'. While crossing the channel, cloud layers and dense persistent contrails made it necessary for the formation to climb one thousand feet (1,000') above bombing altitude to keep the low squadron out of clouds. CP #2 was passed over on course about six(6) minutes early. The course to the IP was about as briefed, but due to a failure of the RF27 unit in the Gee box of the lead a/c, DR navigation was used. The Mickey set could not be used to any extent for securing check points as the operator was having trouble tuning up the beacons.

TARGET MANEUVER:
Between CP #2 and the IP, squadrons fanned out ant took interval, but due to navigational difficulties being experienced, the IP was overshot by about 5 miles. Immediate correction was made to course and a good run was made by the lead and high squadrons on the secondary (Micro-H) target, Rheine, Germany. The low squadron failed to bomb, returning bombs to base, as the PFF equipment was inoperative and the squadron was unable to take position on the high or lead during the bomb run. Bombing could not be done on smoke bombs, as the squadron had to relinquish position to high when this squadron maneuvered directly over them while on the bomb run.

TARGET ATTACKED: (S) M/Y - Rheine, Germany.

TYPE OF BOMBING: Micro H (sq formation)

TIME OF RELEASE: 1508

NBR A/C OVER TARGET: 39 out of 39

NBR A/C ATTACKING: 25

NBR SORTIES CREDITED GP: 39

TOTAL BOMBS LOADED ON A/C TAKING OFF: 408x500 lb. M-43

DISPOSITION OF BOMBS:

Secondary Target:

M/Y - Rheine, Germany	300x500 lb. M-43
Total Bombs Jettisoned	12x500 lb. M-43
Total Bombs Returned	156x500 lb. M-43
Total Bombs Loaded on A/C T.O.	468x500 lb. M-43

BOMBING RESULTS: Unobserved.

RALLY AND ROUTE BACK:
The squadrons got together very well after the target, losing 1,000'. Some interference was experienced when another group ran through our squadrons at the RP, causing prop wash. The withdrawal was substantially as briefed. Navigation was still being done by DR as the Gee box was out and the Mickey set was inoperative for about fifteen (15) minutes after the rally. Let down to 16,000' was as briefed and descent to minimum altitude was started at CP #3, the Dutch coast. The English coast was reached at an altitude of 6,300' and course on to base flown direct.

RETURN TO BASE: 1659-1749

PFF OPERATION:
    Three (3) PFF a/c were scheduled for today's mission. A/C #073 (M/O ANEX) led "A" sq, a/c #025 (M/O GILKEY) led "B" sq and a/c #712 (M/O TOLLIVER) led "C" sq.
     (M/O ANEX) Azimuth stabilization went out over England. Both beacons received but cat beacon intermittent on bomb run and kept fading. Run was made with stabilization off.
     (M/O GILKEY) Set worked very good. Beacon range 200 miles. All check points were called and synchronization was good at last check point.
     (M/O TOLLIVER) Set did not work very satisfactorily. Malfunction in set. Wiring to wave guide pressure pump broken.

WEATHER:
    Surface visibility at take-off was 3,000 yards in haze that extended up to 6-7,000'. 4-6/10 cumulus between 2-5,000'. South of base, broken cumulus became 10/10 stratus, tops 4-4,500'. Dense, persistent contrails were encountered over North Sea from 18-20,000' remaining for 50-60 miles.
     Target area was 10/10 stratus at 4-5,000'. Visibility aloft was unrestricted.
     Route out was the same with patches of cirrostratus above 20,000'. Overcast stratocumulus at base upon return with tops 4-8,000'.
     Free air temperature at bombing altitude (22,000') was -30°C.

COMMUNICATIONS:
Generally good. VHF discipline was poor, because the 487th group was using Channel "A" on its practice mission. Interference was encountered on O8T, also, because the 487th was using station for practice QDN.
Suggest that the using of these facilities for practice purposes during an operational mission be discouraged.

E/A AND FIGHTER SUPPORT:
Meager, inaccurate flak observed in target area.
Fighter support was fair.

FORMATION:
The lead squadron flew very good formation. However, formation for the group as a whole was only fair. Task force formation was good, and the proper interval was maintained between groups on route in and on withdrawal.

ABORTIONS (INCLUDING A/C OVER TARGET AND NOT ATTACKING):
The entire low squadron went over the target and failed to bomb because of PFF equipment being out on the lead a/c. (006 and 194 - 832nd sq, 943 and 712 833rd sq, 034, 010, 580, 945, 998, 963, 958, 149, 311, 312 - 834th sq).

EVALUATION OF LEAD CREWS (BY COMMAND PILOT):

	PILOT
	HOWARD	Entire crew rated Ex. REMARKS: (P) Lacks confidence in his ability, (N) is good, but needs confidence. (C/O) Is on the ball. (R/O) Gets reports in. (M/O) Does good work.
	HINZE	(P) Rated Sup. (B) rated Ex. (PPN), (R/O) rated VS. (B), (C/O) rated S. REMARKS: (P) Smooth and extremely thorough. (N) Couldn't give me a position. (C/O) Reports formation good when it's actually very bad.
	BEARD	(P) rated S. (N), (B) and (M/O) rated Ex. (C/O), (R/O) rated VS. REMARKS: (P) Too rough.

OFFICER TAIL GUNNER REPORTS:
(pilots receiving lower than average grades and why)

PILOT	SQ	GRADE	REMARKS
EWEN	833	F	Too wide and lagged.
GIBBS	833	F	Erratic
(Outstanding performance)
HUNTER	832	Ex	In position all the way.
ELLINGFORD	832	Ex	In position all the way.
SANTA ANNA	832	Ex	Very good element lead.
RINGLER	833	Ex	Beautiful job.

SUGGESTIONS AND REMARKS BY OTG's:
Formation should be tightened up more in enemy territory.

LOSSES: None.

III.

CONCLUSIONS:

    Reports on today's mission again indicate that loose formation is being flown in enemy territory, and particularly over the target. It is recommended that squadron operations, in checking out new pilots in formation flying, instruct them in the formation technique used in this theater. Flying well forward on the lead a/c is particularly desirable when flying at altitude with full bomb load and is not the type of flying taught in phase and transition training.
     While the group usually flies fairly compact formation to the target area, the IP and opening of bomb bay doors is usually the signal for the spreading of most of the formation. Element leads must be impressed with the importance of maintaining steady position and constant airspeed during the bomb run. Wing a/c should make a more earnest effort to fly close, increasing RPM after the IP so as to fly in position. Just several a/c of the high or lead elements lagging can cause a spreading of the squadron formation as planes in lower element of necessity, must fall back to prevent bombs being dropped on them.
     To obtain a good pattern, element leads and wing a/c will have to concentrate on better formation flying during the bomb run. Unfortunately, many of the newer pilots apparently are not quite certain as to just what constitutes good close flying over the target, probably feeling that spreading out is desirable or required. More effort should be made to acquaint pilots with the need for tight positions at the time of bombs away.
     It has also been recommended that a definite Pre-IP point be established on the route in, where the squadrons can fan out and have proper interval established by the time the IP is reached. Otherwise, as happened on today's mission, a squadron may have some sudden malfunction or mechanical difficulty and will not have time to assume a position on another squadron actually engaged in making a bomb run. Air Leaders should be impressed with the importance of taking proper interval and maintaining proper spacing between squadrons while on the bomb run.
     The lead navigator had considerable difficulty with navigation equipment today. The radio compass was inoperative during the latter part of the assembly over the field; the Gee box went out on the route in, and the Mickey Operator was having difficulty in tuning up the beacons on his set and couldn't supply fixes for the determination of position. Navigation was done by DR. It is recommended that two (2) RF27 units be put in the group lead a/c, since 10/10's overcast conditions require almost complete reliance on the Gee box to obtain any accuracy in course and timings, help from H2X operator not being available.
     The procedure of having lead a/c abort after reaching the English coast for practice in reforming the Squadron on the deputy lead is working quite well. Reports of today's mission indicate that good work was done by the high squadron in assuming proper positions after the lead plane left the formation. This also enables the early returning a/c to relay weather information to the remaining leads and tends to expedite interrogation and other lead crew reports that must go in quickly.

For the Commanding Officer:

James F. Gardenhire
Major, Air Corps,
Adjutant