Mission Analysis Report, 14 February 45

LT SNEDEKER

E-BL-3

HEADQUARTERS
486TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

MISSION ANALYSIS REPORT

Planning

DATE: 8 March 1945

GP MSSN NBR: 160

TARGET: (P) Aluminum Plant - Frankfurt, Germany (Micro-H)
(S) M/Y - Frankfurt, Germany (H2X)

ALERTED AT: 1900

BOMB LOAD REC'D AT: 1935

WG AWO REC'D AT: 2100

WG F/O REC'D AT: 0305

DIV F/O REC'D AT: 0230

ZERO HOUR: 1200

FORCE REQUIRED: One (1) group of four (4) squadrons

FORCE FURNISHED BY SQUADRON (PLANNED AND ACTUAL):

	832nd	833rd	834th	835th	Total
Crews	9 (9)	12 (12)	10 (10)	11 (12)	42 (43)
A/C	14 (13)	6 (7)	10 (10)	12 (13)	42 (43)

AIR LEADER: CAPT Dimel (Group Lead)

PARTICIPATING STAFF:
(1) CAPT Simpson (Ld-Hi Sq)
(2) LT Dennis (Ld-Lo Sq)
(3) LT Hodges (Ld-Lo Lo Sq)
(4) LT Hunt (Pass.)
(5) Major McGruder (Pass.)

LEAD CREWS:
(1) Raddatz (Gp-Ld)
(2) Shaw (Dep Ld-ld Sq)
(3) Howard (Gp Dep Ld, Ld-Hi Sq)
(4) Hunter (Dep Ld-Hi Sq)
(5) Hinze (Ld-Lo Sq)
(6) Patteson (Dep Ld-Lo Sq)
(7) Dibble (Ld-Lo Lo Sq)
(8) Snider (Dep Ld-Lo Lo Sq)

BRIEFING OFFICER: CAPT Whitney

BRIEFING TIME: 0800

BOMB BRIEFING: LT Tomas

NAV BRIEFING: LT Maurer

S-2 BRIEFING: Major Morriss

BOMBING ALTITUDE: 24,491'.

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM: 4th "A" Group (second group in Div Formation)

ESTIMATED TIME OF TAKE-OFF: 1045

RETURN: 1825

ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: GP: 12,000' WG: 12,000' DIV: 12,000'

REMARKS:

No difficulties encountered in planning, but group had trouble during climb and on bomb run with cirrostratus clouds at 21,00', restricting visibility, which was not as briefed.

II.

EXECUTION:

TAKE-OFF: 1050-1145 RUNWAY: 07 WIND: 020° @ 20 MPH
A/C TAKING OFF.: SQ "A" 10 SQ "B" 10 SQ "C" 10 SQ "D" 10 CHAFF A/C 3 TOTAL 43
ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: GP: 12,000', WG: 12,000' DIV: 12,000'

ELAPSED TIME OF ASSEMBLY:
One hour and twenty five (1:25) minutes from time of take-off. Lead a/c reached assembly altitude (12,000') at 1210, after late take-off and assumed lead at 1215 after group was almost formed.

ASSEMBLY (GP, WG & DIV):

Group assembly was rather slow because lead a/c was late taking off due to changing a/c. Lead squadron deputy failed to take over as he should have causing some milling of planes, however, high, low and diamond squadrons fell into approximate positions, forming their respective squadrons. The high squadron preceded to form the group and work the rendezvous problem, the lead squadron incompletely formed and trailing on deputy. The lead a/c finally reached assembly altitude and took over the lead just before departing BUN #22. Approaching BUN #16 two (2) minutes early, the group essed into good position behind the wing leader and established good interval. BUN #23 was reached two (2) minutes early, and CP #1 was departed on course, one (1) minute early, in proper position in Division column.

ARRIVED 1ST PT WG ASS'Y LINE: 1230 - two (2) minutes early.

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM: 4th "B" Group (second group in Div Formation)
DEPARTED CP "1": 1244 one (1) minute early.
CLIMB TO ALTITUDE (ROUTE IN):
Climb to bombing altitude was started when the English coast was departed, and over the channel, it was noticed that the wing leader was at least three thousand (3,000) feet below us. As we were gaining on him, the group leader leveled off at 17,700' for about thirteen (13) minutes. Also, there was a cloud layer with base of about 18,000' that the group lead wanted to avoid. Climb was resumed at CP #2. Bombing altitude of 24,250' was reached at 1418 hours, climb being a little slow. The rate of climb to 15,000' was 205'/min., and from 15,000' to 24,000' was 105'/min. Course in was about as briefed, except for a straight leg being flown (missing the Pre-IP) to get a wind - the lead a/c's gee equipment was out. However, group leader advised squadrons to fan out during the run to the IP. Just before reaching this point, the preceding group was overrun because of restricted visibility, and our group had to ess left to establish proper bombing interval.

TARGET MANEUVER:
The IP was passed over with wings level, squadrons in trail of the lead, with about twenty (20) second intervals. Because of the essing previous to the IP, 4th "C" (447th) paralleled our group on the bomb run, but apparently no difficulty was experienced - principally because of the fact that all squadrons ran into a cloud layer and could not see one another. Escaping unscathed, it can be presumed that no interference was actually experienced. "A", "B" and "C" squadrons could not get a good beacon definition, , consequently bombed the secondary by H2X technique. "D" squadron, however, made a very good cat and mouse run on the primary.

TARGET ATTACKED: (P) - "B" Sqd - aluminum plant, Frankfurt, Germany.
(S) - "A", "B" and "C" Sqds - M/Y, Frankfurt, Germany.

TYPE OF BOMBING: (P) - "D" Sqd - Micro-H
(S) - "A" , "B" and "C" Sqds -
H2X by squadron

TIME OF RELEASE: 1443 - 1444 1/2

NBR A/C OVER TARGET: 41 out of 43

NBR A/C ATTACKING:41

NBR SORTIES CREDITED GP: 42

TOTAL BOMBS LOADED ON A/C TAKING OFF: 280x500 lb. M-43 & 240x500 lb M-17.

DISPOSITION OF BOMBS:

Primary Target:
Aluminum plant - Frankfurt, Ger.	70x500 lb. M-43	70x500 lb M-17.
Secondary Target:
M/Y - Frankfurt, Ger.	196x500 lb. M-43	196x500 lb. M-17
Total on all targets:	266x500 lb. M-43	266x500 lb. M-17
Total Bombs Jettisoned:	14x500 lb. M-43	14x500 lb. M-17
Total Bombs Loaded on A/C T.O.	280x500 lb. M-43	280x500 lb. M-17

BOMBING RESULTS: Unobserved.

RALLY AND ROUTE BACK:
Hotshot leader (487th) made a very wide turn toward the RP and disappeared into the clouds. In order not to run into them in those clouds, 4B made a wide turn to the RP and followed the leader wide of the point to preserve wing integrity. The high squadron could see the lead and made good rally, but the low and diamond squadrons became lost in the clouds and cut the rally short, anticipating arrival of lead. Having made the wide swing, the leader was late, putting the low and diamond in front. Both squadrons promptly essed into good position once the group lead was sighted. All squadrons lost 200' off the target. 4C and D groups cut inside and preceded 4A & B on withdrawal. The route out was as briefed with minor deviations to avoid prop wash, and descents were as planned. 4A and B flew almost parallel on the route out as wing leader did not start let down on time, and winds being different at altitudes let them gain on 4B (486th) who had started out ahead.

RETURN TO BASE: 1811 - 1854

PFF OPERATION:
Four (4) PFF a/c were scheduled for today's mission. A/C #218 (R/N-Humphries) led "A" sq, a/c #073 (R/N-Anex) led "B" sq, a/c #074 (R/N-Lacy) led "C" sq and a/c #712 (R/N-Tolliver) led "D" sq.

     (R/N-HUMPHRIES) Set operation was good on the bomb run. Group passed over IP although there was some congestion. Cloud coverage was 9/10, and bombardier made a dead sight run. H2X was used exclusively, with no visual corrections. Rate checks were called starting at 14 miles, and no changes were necessary after synchronization was started.
     (R/N-ANEX) Set operation was good. A dead sight run had been made before synchronization was started. Secondary target was bombed using H2X techniques and information from dead sight run. No visual corrections were made. "A" scope drift method was used, and three (3) rate checks were called. No change was made except displacement.
     (R/N-LACY) Set operation was fair. It was inoperative after take-off until fuses were changed in inverter box. Secondary target was picked up at 18 miles, and H2X synchronization was started at 14 miles. After six check points were called, the bombardier released his bombs on a preceding squadron's smoke bombs. R/N was unaware of this intentions until after bombs away.
     (R/N-Tolliver) Operation of set was good. All check points were called, and synchronization was good at last check point. M-H equipment was good except for weak returns on Namur beacon which was intermittent.

WEATHER:
     There were 6-7/10 low clouds at 2-7,000' over the base at take-off with surface visibility 8 miles. 8-10/10 low clouds continued across the channel and continent with tops gradually rising to 9-10,000' over the target. Visibility in the target area was 8-10 miles High clouds (7-8/10) also prevailed over the target at 25-26,000'.
     Route out was the same as route in except the high clouds diminished to 0-3/10 at the French coast. Base at return was 9-10/10 covered with low clouds at 2,500' to 4,000'. Surface visibility was 10 miles.
     Free air temperature at bombing altitude (24,290') was -34°C.

COMMUNICATIONS:
Communications on this mission - very good. VHF discipline within the group was very good, but the wing leader used incorrect procedure in calling other groups of the wing over VHF, calling them able, baker and charlie, and calling himself able.

E/A AND FIGHTER SUPPORT:
Meager and inaccurate tracking type flak was encountered in the target area, but no enemy a/c were encountered. Fighter support was very good.

FORMATION:
Considering visibility and difficulties, all formations were excellent - squadrons, group and wing. Poor grades on OTG reports were noticeably absent and good grades were very much in evidence. All C/O's remarked that it was the best seen in some time, with squadron leaders really holding it in there. Nice work by all concerned.

ABORTIONS (INCLUDING A/C OVER TARGET AND NOT ATTACKING):

A/C NBR	SQ	REMARKS	PILOT	SORTIE
983	835	Internal failure #3 engine	Schmitz	Yes
800	833	Pilot thought there was gas in the system. Inspection showed a small amount of gas trapped in the hose in bomb bay. Personnel abortion - 50% pilot and 50% aerial engineer	?	no
Malfunctions
580	834	Dropped 45 seconds prematurely. Malfunction in toggle switch.	Newsom	Yes
311	834	Dropped on 580's release.	Williamson	Yes
314	834	Dropped on 580's release.	Bennett	Yes

EVALUATION OF LEAD CREWS (BY COMMAND PILOT):

	PILOT
	Raddatz	(N, (B), (R/N) rated Sup. (P), (PPN), (C/O) rated EX. Remarks: Very good crew.
	Howard	Entire crew rated EX. Remarks: Good work.
	Hinze	(P), (N), (C/O), (R/N) rated EX. (PPN), (R/O) rated VS. (B) rated P. Remarks: (P) good position, (N) good worker, (C/O) good reports, (R/N) knows his equipment. (B) released early for no apparent reason.
	Dibble	Entire crew rated EX.No remarks.

OFFICER TAIL GUNNER REPORTS:
(pilots receiving lower than average grades and why)

	PILOT	SQ	GRADE	REMARKS
	None
(Outstanding performance)
	Hunter	832	EX	In there all the way.
	Ewen	833	EX	Smooth and steady.
	Estersohn	833	EX	Very good position.
	Frawley	833	EX	Exceptionally fine position.
	Dauenhauer	834	EX	Excellent position
	Newsom	834	EX	Very good lead.
	Bennett	834	EX	Constant position all the way.
	Patteson	834	EX	Close and steady throughout the mission.

SUGGESTIONS AND REMARKS BY OTG's:
Visual lead aircraft be informed about flying section and flight leads through top windows and not front windows.

LOSSES: None.

III.

CONCLUSIONS:

     Today's mission was well executed when it finally got under way. The group leader experienced difficulty in starting his a/c (starter failure), and PFF plane was then found to be incompletely equipped, not having smoke bombs attached or the magnesium flare available. This, of course only delayed matters more and could have resulted in leaving the formation without a group leader, a deplorable situation. Steps probably should be taken to have all spare PFF a/c ready for immediate use, for when needed, they will be pressed into instant service, and being lead planes, their presence on the mission as soon as is practicable is extremely important.
     A/C #314 and 311 dropped on the premature (45 sec.) release of a/c #580 (Pilot-Nelson, 834th BS) a wing a/c. A statement from the acting bombardier (a navigator) on a/c/ #580 indicates that the early release was due to a faulty (shorted) toggle switch. Some blame may be charged to the faulty switch, however, an investigation revealed that the panel switch was probably on before the navigator turned the intervalometer counter up. as soon as the counter was moved, the bombs begun to fall out.
     In this instance, a more thorough knowledge of the bomb release mechanism would probably have prevented this premature release. No adequate excuse can be found for a/c #311 (Pilot - Williamson) and #314 (Pilot - Bennett) dropping on the release of this wing a/c.
     Individual squadrons upon reaching assembly altitude had difficulty in forming as the deputy lead did not attempt to form the lead squadron. The high squadron finally took over and started to form the group, the deputy leader of the lead squadron finally pulling into trailing position. It would seem that the deputy leader should have realized his responsibility and formed the group, for had the lead a/c not shown up in time to take over, the group would have been poorly assembled for joining the other groups of the wing at wing assembly. The deputy squadron lead (especially lead squadron) should be an experienced crew, capable of making squadron or group assembly if the if the occasion should arise. Not being able to assume the lead will handicap the assembling and formation of the squadron or group and jeopardize the successful completion of the mission.
     The 486th "C" squadron attacked on the smoke bombs of a preceding group approximately six(6) miles short of the secondary (H2X) target. The bombardier was in doubt as to PFF set operation, and the radar navigator was unaware of his intentions. Check points were systematically called off and squadron naturally released on the smoke bombs of a group attacking the primary target.
     Otherwise, bombing results were probably as good as can be expected, as good H2X runs were made by 486th A and B. D squadron made a good cat and mouse run.
     The caliber of formation flying that was flown on today's mission was an example of the kind of formation desired. Squadron leaders did a very good job of holding position of the group lead, and with very few exceptions, a/c within the squadrons were all flying good positions. Possibly the new type of four (4) squadron formation is going to prove much better all around. It is more flexible, more maneuverable and generally more adaptable for securing a better bomb pattern. By almost unanimous opinion of Air Leaders, lead crews and pilots, it is favored over the old type three (3) squadron formation. If it means better formation flying, it should be made SOP, as that definitely can sometimes mean the difference in success and failure (with possible disaster) of an operational mission.

For the Commanding Officer:

James F. Gardenhire
Major, Air Corps,
Adjutant

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