HEADQUARTERS

486TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

Office of the Operations Officer

MISSION ANALYSIS REPORT

AIR LEADER:  Capt Whitney (Group Lead)

REMARKS:

Planning was poor in that difficulty with weather conditions could probably have been anticipated and steps taken to prevent much of the difficulty encountered.  Multi-layered clouds had tops of 26,000' in target area, making execution of mission a virtual impossibility.

EXECUTION:

TAKE OFF:   0800-0856   RUNWAY:  25    WIND:  270° @ 11 MPH

A/C TAKING OFF:  SQ "A"  9  SQ "B"  10  SQ "C"  10  SQ "D"  10  TOTAL:  39

ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE:  GP 7500'   WG  7,500'  DIV  7,000'

ELAPSED TIME OF ASSEMBLY:

One hour and eleven (1:11) minutes from time of take-off.  Lead a/c reached assembly altitude (7,500') at 0817, and group was completely formed at 0911 hours.

ASSEMBLY (GP, WG & DIV):

Assembly altitude was raised 1,500' because clouds interfered with the forming of the low and diamond squadrons.  Group formed at 7,500' with no further difficulty.  A very good Wing assembly was made with all groups being on time and falling into formation in proper order.  The assembly line, Bunchers 16 and 23, were flown over as planned and CP #1 reached one (1) minute early.  It is assumed that Division assembly was properly made, although haze was already cutting down visibility to a point where groups ahead could hardly be distinguished.

ARRIVED 1ST PT WG ASS'Y LINE:  0914 — one (1) minute early

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM:  4th "C" Group (ninth gp in Div form)

DEPARTED CP "1":  0927 — one (1) min early.

CLIMB TO ALTITUDE (ROUTE IN):

The English coast was departed one (1) minute early.  Climb to bombing altitude (23,000') had already begun and was continued normally.  Over the channel, 4A group was observed below, and it is assumed that they did not start climb as planned.  Course all the way in was very good and essentially as briefed.  Haze and cloud layers restricted visibility along entire route.  At 0900E, 4A started essing.  Groups of 4th Wing held integrity, however, and flew on to vicinity of 1230E, where trouble began.  All groups started running into dense persistent contrails, clouds and haze.  4A group got left of course and went into the Leipzig flak area, while 4B and C (486th) groups maintained briefed course up to the Pre-IP.  While on this leg, 4C fanned out and took squadron interval for bombing of secondary (H2X) target, the high being echeloned off lead (their leader having aborted).  At this time, interval behind 4B was good.  Because of existing weather, all 4C squadrons were forced to climb 3-4,000' prior to IP.  At the Pre-IP, 4A group turned ninety (90) degrees to course coming out of Leipzig, out directly in front of 4C, went right of course and turned back.  Now, getting closer to the IP, weather was building up.  Squadrons in trail could not even see preceding squadrons at this point but only the dense roll of persistent contrails.  Original bombing altitude of 23,000' was reached at 1122 hours, but weather necessitated further climb to a final bombing altitude of 27,000'.  The primary target was passed over on the dry run at 26,000'.  The rate of climb was rather constant, being 194'/min to 15,000', 140'/min to 25,000' and 60'/min to 27,000'.

TARGET MANEUVER:

The briefed IP was overshot to the north in order to maintain Wing integrity.  This was necessary also because of a bunching up of individual squadrons at this point.  Squadrons (lead and high still together) turned to attempt a run on the secondary H2X target.  Weather continued to get worse in the immediate target area.  The lead squadron (high attached) attempted a run, but the R/M could not pick up the target at the newly gained altitude of 26,000' and passed on over the secondary, not bombing.  The low and diamond squadrons attempted runs but could not bomb because of interference from other squadrons in the area.  Target could have been bombed but for this, as R/M's had target in scope.  There were separate squadrons converging on the target from all angles, and even individual a/c were quite prominent.  The diamond squadron could not bomb because of an unidentified squadron flying a course that would have put them directly below us at bombs away.  The squadron  (486D) turned so as not to pass over them.  After passing over the secondary, squadrons (except for lead and high) never got back together.  Proceeding along briefed route out, squadrons supposedly in trail, the LRT IP for bombing of Plauen was made good.  Here again, confusion and disorder resulted when the lead and high attempted a run on this target.  Another squadron came out of one of the numerous cloud blanks and passed under our squadrons just before bombs away.  While the squadron was closing bomb bay doors, one (1) smoke bomb released accidentally.  For once, no one dropped on this accidental release.  All crews were observant enough to recognize that doors were being closed, and bombs were not to be released.  The low and diamond squadrons were successful in making good H2X runs on Plauen and dropped on the target.  The lead and high meanwhile continued along route out and started a run on another LRT at Minigin, but couldn't bomb because of general confusion, and finally made a successful H2X run on Fulda, the last LRT available, from an altitude of 25,000'.

NBR A/C OVER TARGET:  39 OUT OF  39

NBR A/C ATTACKING:  37  NBR SORTIES CREDITED GP:  39

TOTAL BOMBS LOADED ON A/C TAKING OFF:  780 X 250 lb GP

E/A AND FIGHTER SUPPORT:

No flak was encountered, although intense flak was observed in Leipzig area.  No enemy a/c were encountered and friendly fighter support was good.

FORMATION:

Group and squadron formation to IP was very good.  Wing interval (from what could be observed) seemed to be good.  Group integrity was lost after IP, and all squadrons did an excellent job of flying formation under actual instrument conditions.  At times, the low-low flights of the squadron could not be seen.

ABORTIONS (INCLUDING A/C OVER TARGET AND NOT ATTACKING:

EVALUATION OF LEAD CREWS (BY COMMAND PILOTS):

OFFICER TAIL GUNNER REPORTS:

   (outstanding performances)

SUGGESTIONS AND REMARKS BY OTG's:  None.

LOSSES:  None

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Not much can be said about the execution of today's mission, or rather too much cannot be said.  In any event, weather complications were sufficient to prevent decent results, although good H2X runs were finally made on several last resort targets.  While it was planned that bombing was to be done from 23,000', groups and squadrons climbed as high as 28,000' in attempting to evade the adverse weather and clouds prevailing.  A number of mid-air collisions (among other groups) resulted in the general milling about over the target, and it is indeed fortunate that more men and a/c were not lost, visibility being about several hundred feet at the very best, most of the time.

Kodak weather a/c did not accurately portray the true weather conditions existent at the secondary target from a standpoint of permitting bomb to be done by squadrons.  Certainly extreme optimism was displayed in thinking that bomber formations could penetrate the muck with any degree of success, and maintain even group integrity on the bomb run.

General congestion of groups and squadrons resulted after haze, clouds, and dense persistent contrails were encountered at a point just before the Pre-IP.  It was not possible for intelligent coordinated runs to be made, as squadrons were immediately enveloped in the existent cloud banks, and it was a free for all in the clouds to miss, or even see, other planes.  Squadrons on different headings, converged, materialized and concentrated, individually and collectively, on all targets making good runs difficult.

It would seem that since many of the recent missions have been long hauls to support Russian troops, some use should be made of the Russian weather service on the eastern front.  Invariably on these deep penetrations weather is probably the major impediment to the accomplishment to the accomplishment of an otherwise successful mission, and probably a Russian diagnosis of weather in that area could be used with a great deal of success.  Certainly our own forecasts for this particular area are misleading (to say the least) and maximum benefits are not being derived from our bombing.  If more accurate reports were available, bombers could be dispatched where the most good could be accomplished.

And while on the general subject of weather, forecasting and what not, weather reports of conditions existent at the base on return are very poor.  Usually the reports received on W/T or R/T indicate rather favorable weather at the base, and Air Leaders, proceeding on that basis, make certain decisions.  Unfortunately, most of the predictions are purely paper work, and not too practical for actually flying formation at several hundred feet.  Local a/c could be contacted prior to the arrival of the formations for their impressions of the weather, and while no doubt various ideas would be received, still some more accurate knowledge would be gleaned of the actual conditions present.

All a/c should be checked (at intervals) to determine that extra fuses for all electrical equipment are made available for use while in flight.  Frequently difficulty is experienced with some particular piece of equipment and the condition could be easily remedied if proper precautions had been taken to see that fuses are available when needed.

Today's mission was characterized by an exceptionally large number of armament malfunctions.  Some of these malfunctions which have been charged against armament, may possibly have been due to personnel error on the part of the bombardiers.  It is also noted that malfunctions or instances of failure to release the entire bomb load are not being reported by bombardiers.  It is important that malfunctions, if they occur, be reported at the interrogation after each mission.

For the commanding officer

James F. Gardenhire,

Major, Air Corps,

Adjutant

Flimsy